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RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
Mark Pickel and Melissa Pickel challenge the Magistrate Judge’s grant of summary 
judgment against their Fourteenth Amendment substantive and procedural due process 
claims.  These claims—brought against Lancaster County Children and Youth Social 
Services Agency (“LCCYS”), its agents and employees, and two of its contracted workers, 
 
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does                     




Jade Landis and Nicole Lauzus—are based on alleged interference with their rights as 
grandparents in relation to two minors, S.P.L and D.M.L.  The Pickels also alleged that 
LCCYS should be held liable as a municipality pursuant to Monell.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm the Magistrate Judge’s order. 
I.   
Qualified immunity shields officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their 
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.”  Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 253 
(3d Cir. 2010).  In determining whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity, “we 
ask: (1) whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff show the violation of a constitutional 
right, and (2) whether the law was clearly established at the time of the violation.”  Id.   
In determining whether a right is clearly established for the purposes of qualified 
immunity, we must first “define the right allegedly violated at the appropriate level of 
specificity.”  Peroza-Benitez v. Smith, 994 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 2021).  Once this is done, 
we look “to factually analogous Supreme Court precedent, as well as binding opinions from 
our own Court.”   Id. (citing Fields v. City of Phila., 862 F.3d 353, 361 (3d Cir. 2017)) 
(quoting Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 2012)).  We also consider whether 
there is a “robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority in the Courts of Appeals” 
clearly establishing the right in question.  Fields, 862 F.3d at 361 (quoting L.R. v. Sch. Dist. 
of Phila., 836 F.3d 235, 248 (3d Cir. 2016)).  At our discretion, “[w]e may also take into 
account district court cases, from within the Third Circuit or elsewhere.”  Peroza-Benitez, 
994 F.3d at 165-66.   
 
4 
The alleged right that is implicated in both the Pickels’ substantive due process 
claim and their procedural due process claim is derived from the purported liberty interest 
that grandparents have in the care, custody, and management of their grandchildren.  Such 
an interest, however, has not been “clearly established” by relevant law.  The Magistrate 
Judge correctly noted that there is no controlling precedent in our Circuit that defines the 
scope of grandparents’ substantive due process rights with respect to their care of their 
noncustodial grandchildren, and there is a lack of consensus among other Circuits to the 
same.  Pickel v. Lancaster Cnty. Child. & Youth Soc. Servs., No. CV 18-3400, 2020 WL 
5820798, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2020); see Rees v. Off. of Child. and Youth, 473 F. 
App’x 139, 142 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Rees II”) (noting “[t]here is no controlling law on point 
in the Third Circuit concerning grandparents’ substantive due process rights relative to the 
custody and care of their non-resident grandchildren”).  The unsettled state of the law with 
respect to the scope of grandparents’ liberty interests in relation to family integrity stands 
in stark contrast to those of parents’ liberty interests in the care of their children.  See Troxel 
v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (observing that the “liberty interest at issue in this 
case—the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps 
the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court”).  Moreover, four 
other district courts to have considered the issue in our Circuit have determined that 
noncustodial grandparents who have little beyond biological ties to their grandchildren did 
not have a fundamental liberty interest in associating with their grandchildren.  See Rees v. 
Office of Children & Youth, 744 F. Supp. 2d 434, 451-52 (W.D. Pa. 2010) [“Rees I”]; 
Clayton v. Children’s Choice, 2010 WL 3282979, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 2010); Bresko 
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v. Critchley, 2012 WL 3066640, at *5 (D.N.J. July 26, 2012); Derr v. Northumberland 
Cnty., 2019 WL 6210898, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2019).  Given the dearth of precedential 
caselaw in our Circuit concerning the scope of grandparents’ constitutional liberty interests 
in caring for their grandchildren, the individual Appellees in this action are entitled to 
qualified immunity with respect to both Fourteenth Amendment claims as the right that is 
implicated here has not yet been “clearly established.” 1 
II. 2  
The Pickels also assert claims against LCCYS directly, which is treated as a 
municipal entity under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).  
See Hatfield v. Berube, 714 F. App’x 99, 103 n.1 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting “Pennsylvania 
county offices of children and youth are treated as municipalities for purposes of Monell.”) 
(citing Mulholland v. Gov’t Cty. of Berks, 706 F.3d 227, 237 (3d Cir. 2013)).  “When a suit 
against a municipality is based on § 1983, the municipality can only be liable when the 
alleged constitutional transgression implements or executes a policy, regulation or decision 
 
1 The Pickels contend that they stood in loco parentis toward both S.P.L. and D.M.L., which they 
argue strengthens their claim that they possessed substantive and procedural due process rights in 
associating with them.  Without taking a view as to whether they in fact attained this in loco 
parentis status or not, we maintain that grandparents’ liberty interests in exercising care and control 
over their grandchildren are not sufficiently “clearly established” to hold the individual Appellees 
liable. 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  We review de novo the District Court’s grant of summary judgment.  Goldenstein v. 
Repossessors Inc., 815 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2016).  Summary judgment is appropriate only if, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, “there is no genuine dispute as 
to any material fact,” such that “the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Hayes v. 
Harvey, 903 F.3d 32, 40 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). 
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officially adopted by the governing body or informally adopted by custom.”  Mulholland, 
706 F.3d at 237 (quoting Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996)).   
 The Pickels allege that “LCCYS violated the Pickels’ constitutional rights to family 
integrity by not having certain policies in place.  Appellant Br. 35.  They further argue that 
“LCCYS, in some instances, had affirmative policies, procedures, practices, and/or 
customs which violated their constitutional rights to family integrity.”  Id. at 35-36.  
 To the extent the Pickels allege they were harmed by LCCYS policy, their claims 
fail as they do not adequately link the purportedly responsible policymaker with final 
authority—in this instance, Crystal Natan, the Executive Director of LCCYS—to the 
policies that have allegedly resulted in injury.  See McTernan v. City of York, Pa., 564 F.3d 
636, 658-59 (3d Cir. 2009).  Indeed, their allegations primarily appear not to be concerned 
with LCCYS’s official policies, but instead with its “unwritten practice of ignoring… 
written policy” with respect to collaborating in good faith with all relevant relatives and 
stakeholders involved in child dependency, placement, and custody proceedings.  
Appellant Br. 41. 
 The Pickels do not fare better, however, in alleging that any unofficial LCCYS 
customs have violated their constitutional rights.  The core of the Pickels’ argument is that 
LCCYS failed to train its caseworkers with respect to their evaluation of kinship care 
applications, providing relatives with notice of court proceedings, and advising 
caseworkers of the rights of individuals that possess in loco parentis status vis-à-vis 
dependent minors.    In order to establish liability under § 1983, “a municipality’s failure 
to train its employees in a relevant respect must amount to ‘deliberate indifference to the 
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rights of persons with whom the [untrained employees] come into contact.’”  Id. (quoting 
City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)) (alteration in original).   
Deliberate indifference “is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a 
municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.”  Thomas v. 
Cumberland Cnty., 749 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 
410).  “Without notice that a course of training is deficient in a particular respect, 
decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training program that will 
cause violations of constitutional rights.”  Id. (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 62).  As noted 
by the Magistrate Judge, the Pickels do not allege that LCCYS had prior notice of its 
purportedly deficient training program, nor do they provide any evidence that a “pattern of 
similar constitutional violations by untrained employees” occurred such that LCCYS could 
be said to have acted with “deliberate indifference.”  Connick, 563 U.S. at 62; App. 28-29.  
Consequently, the Pickels cannot succeed on a failure-to-train theory either, and their 
municipal liability claims against LCCYS fail. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment against the Pickels. 
 
 
 
